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Abstract: 
In this paper, we discuss the main economic aspects of the European 
Microsoft  case;  in  particular,  Microsoft’s  refusal  to  supply  the 
necessary information to make the competitors’ work group server 
systems interoperable with Windows Operating System. The case can 
be seen as an example of competition between networks. We review 
the relevant economics literature with the objective of understanding 
the motivations behind Microsoft’s strategies.  
JEL codes: L4, O3, L1 
Keywords:  Networks,  Complementarities,  Foreclosure, 
Interoperability, Antitrust 
 
Forthcoming in Rubini, L. ed., Microsoft on Trial: Legal and Economic Analysis of a 
Transatlantic Antitrust Case (2009, Elgar). 
1.  Introduction 
Microsoft has been under scrutiny of both the Department of Justice in the US and 
the European Competition Commission in the EU (EC henceforth) in two complex 
cases that spanned over a number of years. These cases have been followed with 
great  interest  by  economists,  both  academic  economists  and  practitioners,  all 
around the world. This is perhaps due to the fact that the computing industry is an industry  in  which  a  number  of  economic  arguments  such  as  network  effects, 
complementarities and R&D incentives interplay and affect the effective level of 
competition.  In fact, there is a feeling among economists that we can learn a lot 
about  strategic  behaviour  in  rapidly  changing  environments  by  understanding 
Microsoft’s strategies (Carlton, 2001).  
In  the  European  case,  two  of  Microsoft’s  strategies  were  investigated.  First, 
Microsoft’s refusal to supply the essential information to make Sun Microsystems’s 
work  group  server  operating  system,  Solaris,  compatible  with  Windows.  This 
investigation followed the formal complaint by Sun Microsystems before the EC, 
in  which  it  accused  Microsoft  of  behaving  anti-competitively  by  denying  this 
necessary  information.  Microsoft  was  accused  of  trying  to  reduce  the 
interoperability of Windows with other products produced by competitors in order 
to leverage its market power in the PC operating systems market onto the work 
group operating system market, market in which Microsoft was also active.  
The second issue involved in the case was Microsoft’s practice of tying Windows 
Media  Player  with  Windows  operating  system,  two  complementary  products. 
Microsoft was accused of abusing its dominant position in the PC operating system 
to  foreclose  competition  in  the  media  player  market.  The  investigation  of  this 
practice was initiated by the EC by its own initiative, that is, without a third party 
filing a formal complaint against Microsoft. This second issue is reminiscent of the 
US  case,  in  which  Microsoft  was  under  trial  because  of  tying  Windows  with 
Explorer.  Although the two practices assessed by the EC (denying the essential 
information to achieve compatibility and tying) are quite different, they also share 
some similarities, as both can be seen as ways to leverage market power onto a complementary  market.  Moreover,  in  both  cases,  the  existence  of  network 
economies is at the core of the discussion.  
The EC’s duty is to enforce the European Competition rules on anticompetitive 
business  practices  and  abuses  of  monopoly  power  within  the  entire  European 
Union when  competition and the free market  are affected. The EC  can impose 
changes in the company behaviour (the so-called remedies) and also impose fines.  
On the 24
th of March 2004, the EC published its decision on the case,
1 concluding 
that Microsoft had breeched the  EC law by leveraging its monopoly power in the 
PC operating systems market onto the work group servers operating market and 
onto the market for media players. The  remedies imposed on Microsoft were as 
follows: First, Microsoft was required to disclose to its competitors the necessary 
information to make their products interoperable with Windows operating system.
2  
Second,  Microsoft was ordered to untie   Windows and Media Player. In other 
words, Microsoft was ordered to offer to PC manufacturers a version of Window 
without Windows Media Player. In addition to those remedies, Microsoft was 
imposed a fine of €497 million for abusing its dominant position in the European 
Union.
3 
Mario Monti, who was   the European Competition Com missioner at that time, 
stated that the decision would restore the conditions for fair  competition in the 
markets concerned. The Commissioner also expressed the EC’s concerns about the 
                                                           
1 See EC Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. 
2 It is important to clarify that Microsoft was not asked to disclose the source code of Windows but only 
“complete and accurate specifications for the protocols” used by Windows work group servers in order 
to interoperate with Windows. 
3 Microsoft appealed to European Court of Appeal without success. Microsoft was also been fined for 
not compliance, that is, for not implementing the remedial measures, at later stages. The largest non-
compliance fine imposed on Microsoft amounted €899 million. In May 2008, Microsoft appealed again 
(this time to the European Court of First Instance) with the objective of overturning the €899 million 
fine. Microsoft’s general business model, which was thought to deter innovation and to 
reduce  consumer  choice.  The  Commissioner  expressed  his  conviction  that  the 
decision would establish clear principles for the future conduct of Microsoft.  
Generally, we can say that competition policy aims at ensuring that competition in 
the marketplace is not restricted in a way that is detrimental to society (Motta, 
2004). The basic underlying principle is that a monopoly is allocatively inefficient.  
In other words, it leads to a loss in surplus (or deadweight loss). 
4 This constitutes 
the rationale behind policy makers’ interest in creating the conditions that make 
markets as competitive as possible, as the lower the degree of competition, the less 
(allocatively) efficient the market is.  However, the usefulness of this argument in 
guiding  competition  policy  is  rather  limited,  especially  in  R&D  intensive 
industries. Allocative efficiency is related to the market performance in “static” 
terms. However, one should also consider the dynamic effects of competition in 
order to assess the welfare effects of monopolies or, by extension, of oligopolies. 
For  example,  it  is  far  from  clear  that  innovation  rates  and  market  power  are 
negatively related, as firms will not have incentives to conduct R&D unless they 
can appropriate the returns to their investments.  
The objective of the article is to provide a broad picture of what economics can say 
about  competition  in  computer  industries  in  general  and  about  the  European 
Microsoft case in particular. To achieve this aim, we will review the academic 
                                                           
4 The basic story is the following:  A monopolist typically charges higher prices than a perfectly 
competitive firm would do. As a consequence, consumers are worse-off than they would be if the market 
was perfectly competitive (in other words, consumer surplus is lower in a monopoly than in perfect 
competition). However, a monopolist also earns higher profits than the competitive firms (in other 
words, producer surplus is higher in a monopoly than in perfect competition). Crucially, the latter cannot 
compensate for the reduction of consumer surplus and therefore social welfare is found to be lower in a 
monopoly than in a perfectly competitive market.  
 contributions within the economics literature that are relevant for the case. Due to 
space constraints, we will focus on the first of the two practices, that is, Microsoft’s 
refusal  to  supply  competitors  with  the  essential  information  to  achieve 
interoperability with Windows.  
So that to lay the grounds for the rest of the article, first we will describe the 
different  elements  in  computer  systems  and  how  they  give  rise  to  separate  but 
complementary markets. The definition of a market is a crucial step in the antitrust 
process and therefore, we will discuss this definition in the case. Next, we will 
discuss the nature of competition in the computer markets. It is relevant to note that 
although there are only a small number of firms in each of the computer markets, 
this does not necessary imply lack of competition.  In fact, many analysts regard 
computer markets are highly dynamic and exposed to a lot of competition. The type 
of competition in these markets can be defined as Schumpeterian.  In this article, 
we will describe the dynamics of competition in Schumpeterian markets.  
Since one of the reasons why computer markets are Schumpeterian is the existence 
of network externalities, we will provide an overview of the literature on network 
economics  and  will  use  its  main  results  to  discuss  the  Microsoft  case,  paying 
particular  attention  to  the  (potential)  reasons  for  Microsoft’s  actions.  We  will 
discuss  that  the  case  can  be  seen  as  competition  between  two  systems  (Wintel 
platform) vs. platforms around work group servers. Typically in such cases, the 
incumbent firm (dominant platform) has incentives to deny interoperability so that 
to  protect  its  market  dominance.  We  will  discuss  the  incentives  to  degrade 
interoperability as studied by the economics literature. Finally, we will consider the remedies  imposed  by  the  EC  and  its  implications  in  terms  of  innovation  and 
welfare, which are far from univocal. 
The  structure  of  the  article  is  as  follows:    In  section  2,  we  will  describe  the 
elements integrating computer systems. In section 3, we will define what network 
economies are and the extent of their existence in computer markets. In section 4, 
we will analyse the market definition in the Microsoft case. In section 5, we will 
discuss the Schumpeterian nature of competition in computer markets. In section 6, 
we will discuss economic contributions regarding foreclosure and interoperability. 
Section 7 is devoted to the innovation and welfare implications of the remedies 
imposed on Microsoft. Section 8 summarises the article and provides some final 
remarks.   
2.  Computer systems: Definition and elements 
A computer system is constituted by hardware and software. The hardware are the 
physical components of the system and the software are the computer programs. 
Software can be system software or application software. An application is a piece 
of software that targets a specific user’s need. For example, word-processing or 
playing music. Two examples of Microsoft applications are Word and Windows 
Media Player for word-processing and playing music respectively. The purpose of 
the system software is to control the hardware of the computer and linking the 
applications and the hardware. This link can only work if both the applications and 
the system software use the same application programming interface (API). Some 
examples of interfaces are UNIX API or JAVA API.  Users and sellers of hardware and software normally interact around “platforms”. 
According to the definition in The Linux Information Project (LINFO)
5, the term 
platform refers to (i) the type of processor and/or other hardware on which a given 
operating system or application program runs, (ii) the type of operating system or 
(iii) the combination of the type of hardware and the type of operating system 
running on it. Examples of platforms are IBM System 360, Apple Macintosh or 
Windows, the platform controlled by Microsoft. For the purpose of this chapter, we 
will use the second meaning of “platform”, that is the type of operating system.
6  
The  system  software  can  also  be  called  “platform  software”,  as  it  serves  as  a 
platform  for  all  the  applications  that  use  the  same  interface  than  the  operating 
system.  For  example,  the  interface  needed  to  interact  with  Windows  operating 
system  is  the  Win  32  API,  also  property  of  Microsoft.  To  allow  any  software 
application to function in a computer using Windows, it would be necessary to 
make it compatible with the interface Win 32 API. Other examples of interfaces are 
UNIX API and Java APIs. 
Typically,  computer  users  will  interact  among  them.    In  order  to  do  so,  their 
computers will have to be interconnected, constituting a network, typically through 
a server computer. In such a situation, a further piece of software is needed, the so-
called “work group server operating system”, which enables the communication 
                                                           
5 http://www.linfo.org/platform.html 
6 Interestingly, different platforms are vertically integrated to different extents (Bresnahan and 
Greenstein, 1999 and Evans et al., 2004). In the case of mainframe computers, there is a single platform 
offered by a single firm (IBM) with high levels of vertical integration (including hardware). In the case 
of the PCs, the IBM PC platform was initially controlled by IBM, although later it became controlled by 
two other companies, one active in the (applications and operating systems) software market, Microsoft, 
and the other, in the micro-processors market, Intel. For an interesting discussion of the role played by 
extent of vertical integration on the success of different platforms see Evans et al. (2004). 
 between  (non-server)  computers  and  servers.  The  “non-server”  computers 
connected to the server are often referred to as “client” computers. As mentioned 
above, the first of the issues in the Microsoft case regarded Microsoft’s refusal to 
supply  Sun,  a  work  group  server  operating  system  producer,  the  necessary 
information to make its product, Solaris, which is UNIX based, interoperable with 
Windows.   
It is obvious that the different elements of the systems described above are goods 
that are complements from the point of view of the consumer, as they have to be 
used in conjunction. Two goods are complements if their demands are positively 
related. For example, take Windows and the applications for Windows. If there is a 
decrease in the price of the operating system Windows would give rise not only to 
an increase in its own demand but also to an increase in the demand of applications 
supported by Windows.
7  The existence of complementarities between products has 
important implications for the market power that a firm dominant in one of the 
markets can extend into the complementary market.  It is also relevant to note that 
given the need that computer users have of interacting with other computer users, 
computer systems  will   be subject to network effects .  In the next section we 
describe the nature of those effects. 
      3. Network effects 
Since  computer  users  interact  among  them,  computer  systems  or  platforms  are 
subject to network effects. The higher the number of users of one specific platform 
or system, the higher the demand of this platform is. This is a typical example of 
network  effect,  because  the  utility  the  system  provides  to  each  individual  user 
                                                           
7 If goods are substitute, a decrease in the price of one leads to an increase in the demand of the other.  increases with the total number of users of the same platform. The intuition is clear: 
Computer users share frequently documents created in their own computers with 
other users. Consumers therefore benefit from an increase in the number of users of 
their platform, as this reduces incompatibility risks and costs. In fact, the above is 
an example of “direct” network effect.  
Additionally,  an  “indirect”  network  effect  arises  when  a  particular  feature  of  a 
network is likely to be improved in a large network (see Scotchmer, 2004). For 
example, the number of applications written for a given platform increases with the 
number of users of this platform; therefore a user of a given platform would benefit 
from an increase in the number of users of that platform through the wider range of 
available software.  
It is worth mentioning that the wide availability of software is, in any case, a major 
determinant of the success of platforms. Interestingly, Apple and Microsoft have 
tried to encourage the writing of applications for their platforms. For example, in 
the late 90s Microsoft was spending over $250 million yearly on developer-related 
activities, such as training programs, marketing or research (Evans et al., 2004). By 
helping developers, they were facilitating the creation of new software applications, 
which  in  turn,  increased  the  likelihood  of  new  users’  adopting  Windows.  In 
addition, the availability of applications available for a platform would constitute 
an entry barrier for other operating systems/platforms. 
All in all, it is important to bear in mind that not only the existence of network 
economies but also the size of the networks (or in our case, the number of users in a 
platform)  affects  crucially  the  competitive  environment  in  an  industry.  Further, 
there  are  interesting  strategic  implications  of  making  a  network  or  platform compatible or incompatible with another competing network. We will discuss with 
this issue in more detail in section 6. Now we turn our attention to the definition of 
the relevant markets in the Microsoft case. 
4.   Definition of relevant markets 
The  first  stage  in  the  assessment  of  any  antitrust  case  is  the  definition  of  the 
relevant  market.  A  market  comprises  all  the  products  or  services  that  are 
substitutable by the consumer. In principle, based on the description of computer 
systems made above, the markets for the different elements of the computer system 
should be considered to be separate (although complementary) markets. The EC 
identified two markets as relevant for the Microsoft case and separate from the 
point of view of the consumer: the market for (client) PC operating systems and the 
market  for  work  group  server  operating  systems.    The  EC  considered  that  the 
operating systems created for servers could not be used on PC hardware. Their 
argument was that such use would either not be technically viable or would deprive 
the user of hardware or software capabilities. Further, the EC stated that the work 
group server operating systems fulfilled a specific demand need and neither other 
server  operating  systems  or  PC  operating  systems  were  realistic  substitutes  for 
them.
8  
The definition of the relevant market made by the  EC was based on qualitative 
(mostly technical) judgements. As far as I am aware, no statist ical or econometric 
study was conducted by or on behalf of the Commission to estimate the demand of 
the two identified markets.  Such an analysis could have been used to test the 
                                                           
8 The Commission conducted a market enquiry to study the substitutability between different types of 
servers. For more details on this and Microsoft’s statements, see section 5.11.2.11 in the Commission 
Decision Case COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. validity of the qualitative analysis referred above. Interestingly, Van Reenen (2004) 
conducted an empirical study to estimate market level elasticities for servers, the 
results of which  lend support to the EC’s view that the work group server and their 
operating  systems  are  a  separate  market  from  other  servers  or  other  type  of 
operating  systems  (such  as  PCs  operating  systems)  is  correct.  Van  Reenen’s 
estimates  of  demand  elasticities  for  work  group  server  systems  (hardware  and 
software) are relatively low,
9 indicating that a price increase in the work group 
server operating systems  would not affect dramatically the quantity demanded of 
work group servers. This implies that there are no good substitutes for work group 
servers from the consumers’ point of view.  
The empirical analysis of the work group server operating systems is more difficult 
as its demand is derived from the demand for the work group server hardware, as 
Van Reenen (2004) highlights. Further, hardware and software are often sold as 
bundles. This implies that it is difficult or impossible to collect good data on prices 
of server software. It can be argued, however, that given that the demand of work 
group server operating systems is derived from that of the work group server, if the 
latter is inelastic, the earlier has to be even more inelastic, therefore showing the 
existence of a market for work group server operating systems which is separate 
from those of other types of operating systems (server and client). 
Apart from making any judgements about demand-side substitutability, it is also 
necessary to consider the separation from the point of view of the supply in order to 
reach any conclusions regarding the separation of the PC operating systems and the 
work group server software markets. Two markets are deemed to be separate from 
point of view of the supply if a small but significant permanent price increase in 
                                                           
9 Often the work group servers are sold as a hardware and software bundle. one of the markets would not lead to entry into that market by firms active in the 
other market.
10 In the absence of entry barriers, such a price increase would attract 
entry. However, the need of incurring in high development costs or the existence of 
network externalities, either di rect or indirect, may act as barriers to entry and 
make entry unprofitable. The EC rejected the existence of supply-side substitutes 
for PC operating systems by concluding that softwa re developers in adjacent 
markets  would  not  be  able  to  start  producing  PC  operating  systems  without 
substantial costs and risks. Similar arguments were used to support the same 
conclusion regarding work group server operating systems.   
5.  The nature of competition in the computer industry 
The prominence of Microsoft in the computer industry is obvious.  Their market 
share in the operating systems market was at the time of the antitrust case as high 
as  95%  according  to  the  EC.  Was  therefore  Microsoft  an  unthreatened  (quasi) 
monopoly at that time?  
It  is  difficult  to  deny  that  there  is  competition  in  the  industry,  even  in  those 
segments where there are “quasi-monopolies” such as the PC systems segment. The 
computing industry is a rapidly evolving, constantly changing technological sector. 
Often  companies  become  dominant,  but  their  dominance  is  contested  by  new 
entrants (normally, as a result of technological innovations). In some cases these 
new companies even manage to displace the former incumbents. Bresnahan (2002) 
and Bresnahan and Greenstein (1999) illustrate with examples how the computer 
industry has followed those dynamics. This type of competition dynamics can be 
labelled as “Schumpeterian”. 
                                                           
10 Markets which are close either geographically or technologically. The Schumpeterian paradigm describes competition in a dynamic fashion from an 
evolutionary perspective.  An incumbent firm holds a dominant position until a 
firm  enters  the  market  with  a  successful  innovation  and  displaces  the  former 
incumbent.    This  theory  therefore  explains  progress  and  economic  growth  by 
means of this “creative destruction”.
11  Innovation, in Schumpeterian terms, is only 
a source of temporary market power. In the computing industry, there are only a 
small number of software platforms at any one time due to the existence of network 
economies.  Further,  sunk  costs  incurred  by  both  consumers  and  software 
application  developers  imply  that  the  incumbents  in  the  platform  markets  will 
enjoy market dominance until a successful innovator appears in the market. The 
length of time during which an incumbent can hold its dominant position can be 
assimilated to a technological era.  
This leads to a second question regarding the successful innovator: Where can such 
firm come from? An innovator can come from a neighboring market, for example, 
the  market  for  a  complementary  good.  According  to  Bresnahan  (2002), 
technologies spend years without competing with each other by serving different 
segments of the market.  These different technologies can become competitors by 
technological or market change, this is the so-called “indirect entry”.   
If  we  believe  that  competition  in  the  computing  industry  takes  place  in  a 
Schumpeterian way, Microsoft is so dominant because the nature of the industry 
leads to this type of outcomes (large dominant firms). This does not mean that it is 
not facing any competitive threat (Evans and Schmalensee, 2000). In fact, some 
very reputed scholars, such as Economides or Schmalensee, question the need or 
even usefulness of antitrust actions against Microsoft. 
                                                           
11 For more details see Schumpeter (1942). Economides (2001) emphasizes that the fact that there are dominant firms in the 
market does not imply the existence of weak competition and claims that antitrust 
intervention in the computing industry is futile due to a number of reasons. In 
particular, given that the industry is a “winner takes most” (due to the existence of 
network  effects),
12  imposing  a  diff erent  market  structure  would  generate 
inefficiencies. Further, even if antitrust authorities eliminate barriers to entry, once 
a few firms are established in the market, the addition of a new  firm would not 
change dramatically market shares and prices.  
Schmalensee (2000) indicates that traditional tests for monopoly should not be used 
in the computing industry. Given that the industry is Schumpeterian, the leaders 
will necessarily have high market shares and the existence of network and scale 
economies will act as barriers to entry. Using traditional tests will lead to the 
conclusion  that  the  software  industry  is  highly  monopolised  (by  different 
companies in different segments)  and therefore should be under tight scrutiny of 
antitrust authorities. However, Schmalensee (2000) points out that this conclusion 
goes against the view of many  analysts, who consider the computing industry as 
highly competitive, with aggressive innovation races and current monopolists being 
threatened and frequently overtaken by superior products. This type of competitive 
threat is not accounted for in the traditional tests for monopoly power. Further, if 
there  can be only one survivor, the incumbent must exclude its com petitors; 
otherwise, it will disappear from the market place. This poses the question whether 
strategies to survive can be labelled as “anticompetitive”. Even more importantly, 
if the natural equilibrium is to have a monopoly, restraining competition can only 
harm welfare, especially if competition involves investments in innovation, product 
                                                           
12 We will discuss in more detail the literature on network effects later in this article. development  or  low  prices.  It  follows  from  Schmalensee’s  argument  that  no 
antitrust  action should  be taken against Microsoft, as  the  corporation is  simply 
trying to secure its survival. 
In the upcoming sections we will discuss some relevant academic contributions 
regarding network effects that are helpful to understand the reasons that might exist 
behind Microsoft’s actions as well as the consequences of them.  
6.  Foreclosure and competition between systems 
In this section we will provide a concise overview of the academic contributions 
dealing with network economies, paying special attention to the strategic issues 
derived from the choice of compatibility (or interoperability) between competing 
systems. Before starting, let us summarise the case building on the basics discussed 
in the previous section. 
Microsoft  produced  two  goods,  operating  systems  and  group  server  software, 
which are complement products. Sun was also in the market for server software, 
therefore  competing  in  that  market  with  Microsoft.  Microsoft  was  clearly  the 
market leader the operating systems market, with Windows installed on most PCs.  
As a consequence of the ubiquity of Windows and the existence of network effects, 
Sun  needed  to  make  its  product  compatible  or  interoperable  with  Windows; 
otherwise, Solaris would be of very little value to a vast majority of consumers. In 
fact, even evidence supplied by Microsoft to the EC
13 highlighted the importance 
for work group servers of the degree of interoperability with PC (and therefore with 
their operating systems). It is obvious therefore that  Microsoft’s refusal put Sun in 
a very difficult competitive situation in the work server market.  
                                                           
13 See page 106, EC Decision Case COMP/C- 3/37.792 Microsoft. All in all, as indicated in the introductory section, Microsoft was accused by the EC 
of leveraging its market power onto work group server operating systems market. 
However, according to  the traditional views  of economists, a monopoly  in  one 
market  does  not  have  incentives  to  monopolise  a  complementary  market. 
Furthermore, Microsoft’s strategy changed overtime. Interestingly, in the beginning 
of  the  development  of  the  market  for  work  group  server  operating  systems, 
Microsoft did disclose all the necessary information to make Windows compatible 
with its competitors’ products. To understand the reasons behind Microsoft’s early 
and  late  strategy,  let  us  turn  our  attention  to  the  economic  literature  on 
complementary markets and competition between networks. 
 
6.1 The view of the Chicago School versus the incentives to foreclose potential 
competitors. 
The  main  line  of  defence  of  Microsoft  is  based  around  the  Chicago  School 
argument of “one monopoly profit theory”.
14 According to this view, a monopolist 
does not have any incentives to monopolise a complementary market since it can 
extract all the profits from it by increasing the price in the monopolised market. 
Illustrating this argument with the case, Microsoft could have raised the monopoly 
rents in the server software market by increasing the price of Windows operating 
system. Reducing the interoperability of Windows with the servers produced by the 
competitors would only lead to a reduction of the price consumers would be willing 
to pay for Windows. 
Following the Chicago School’s argument, we cannot find any reason to accuse 
Microsoft  of  behaving  anticompetitively  by  degrading  interoperability.  In  the 
                                                           
14 See recital 765 in the EC decision, COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. Chicago  School  theory,  the  monopolist  firm  does  not  have  any  incentives  to 
foreclose rivals in adjacent markets because of the lack of threat of entry. But is it 
very realistic to assume that Microsoft did not face any threat of entry?  
On one hand, entry in both the PC and work group server operating system markets 
seemed to be expensive and time consuming. In fact, the EC stated these reasons to 
reject the existence of supply-side substitutability.  Windows operating systems is 
protected by the wide range of applications available in the Windows platform, 
which act as a short run barrier. This, in principle, should preserve Microsoft’s 
(quasi) monopoly of the operating systems market.  
However, the Commission also  stated that it could  not  be excluded that  in  the 
future there would be firms challenging Microsoft’s dominant position in the PC 
operating systems market. Microsoft’ actions could therefore aim at foreclosing 
potential  competitors.  By  strengthening  its  position  in  the  work  group  server 
market,  Microsoft  could  reinforce  the  barriers  to  entry  into  the  PC  operating 
systems market: Any future competitor in the PC operating system market would 
have to produce a system which would need to be interoperable with Microsoft’s 
work group server operating system.
15 It is important to note that there is evidence 
that  Microsoft  worried  about  some  competitors  (Sun,  Oracle  and  Netscape)
16 
pushing for a model of centralised comput ing, with  servers  at the core of the 
systems.
17 Microsoft seemed to acknowledge the threat to  the dominance of the 
Windows platform which this new computing model constituted. 
                                                           
15 See recital 769 in , COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. 
16 See recital 771, COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft. 
17 It seems that Microsoft is also pushing for this model now, with the launching of Microsoft Azure 
cloud platform. Kuhn and Van Reenen (2007) explain very clearly how this new model threatened 
the  dominance  of  the  Windows  platform:  In  the  late  90s,  a  larger  number  of 
applications could be delivered via servers, therefore putting users in less need of 
purchasing  an  expensive  operating  system  such  as  Windows  for  their  personal 
computers, as they could simply use the applications thorough the servers. If users 
started  using  more  frequently  applications  delivered  by  servers,  software 
developers  would  increasingly  write  applications  in  the  open  standards  which 
server operating systems typically use.  
It is worth reminding here the competitive dynamics of Schumpeterian industries. 
As  discussed  before,  in  Schumpeterian  industries,  competition  derives  from 
technological advances and competitors often come from neighbouring markets. In 
this case, although the server operating systems were not directly competing with 
the PC operating systems (as both constitutes different markets), they were posing 
a threat due to the technological changes which were making Windows operating 
system less necessary for computer users.  
Given this threat, Microsoft could have chosen to protect itself by monopolising the 
server  software  market,  consequently  eliminating  the  potential  competition  of 
Windows. This would protect Microsoft’s operating system in two ways. First, as 
indicated  by  the  EC,  if  Microsoft  was  dominant  in  the  work  group  operating 
systems, any PC operating system producer would have to seek interoperability 
with  Windows  work  group  server  operating  system.  This  would  constitute  an 
additional barrier to entry into the operating system market. Second, if Microsoft 
increased  its  market  share  in  the  server  operating  systems  market,  software 
developers would gradually shift away from writing software for other platforms, this would lead consumers to switch to Microsoft, reducing again the incentives of 
software developers to write software for other platforms (Kuhn and Van Reenen, 
2007).
18 
All in all, we have seen that Microsoft could have  had  incentives to foreclose 
competition in the complem entary market of work group servers as a way to 
eliminate the potential  threat of work group server software to PC operating 
systems. Essentially, the case can be interpreted as follows: Microsoft’s operating 
system, Windows, is at the core of the dominating system. Potential competitors to 
this system arise in the late 90s: The systems around work group server operating 
systems (and in particular, around Solaris).  Naturally, Microsoft would want to 
foreclose  the  (potential)  competing  system.  A  way  to  this  is  to  degrade 
interoperability.  In  the  next  section,  we  review  some  contributions  regarding 
competition  between  systems,  so  that  to  better  understand  the  dynamics  of 
competition between systems.  
6.2. Basic aspects of competition between systems with network effects 
As discussed above, computer systems are subject to network effects. It is therefore 
appropriate to discuss the literature on competition between networks to understand 
competition between computer systems. As each system has a network associated 
to it, the number of users of the system determines the size of its network. 
Competition between systems has some distinctive features that separate it from 
competition  between  individual  goods.  Katz  and  Shapiro  (1994)  or  Scotchmer 
                                                           
18 In addition to this dynamic incentives to foreclose competition, Kuhn and Van Reenen (2007) provide another 
static motivation: By dominating the server market, Microsoft could price discriminate more effectively in the 
operating systems market. Large firms would typically be less sensitive to the price of operating systems and 
therefore Microsoft would like to charge them a higher price than it would charge to small firms. Microsoft could 
identify large firms because they are willing to pay more for the complementary product (server systems). (2004)  highlight  the  fact  that  in  many  cases,  the  components  for  a  system  are 
bought in several stages. For example, at individual level, a consumer typically 
buys a computer, an operating system and some pieces of software at a given point 
in time, but will buy (at least she might consider buying) some other pieces of 
software or upgrades at a later stage. As a consequence of this, consumers will have 
to create some expectations about the availability of software for their purchased 
computer in the future. Other things being equal, software developers will write 
more applications for those platforms with a higher number of users. 
Furthermore,  different  generations  of  consumers  will  be  buying  these  goods  in 
different periods of time. When buying goods in time 1, a consumer will make her 
expectations about the future number of users of the network around each system 
and will adopt (other things being equal) the system that will have the highest 
number of users. In both cases, it can be clearly seen that competition between 
systems  in  not  static.  In  fact,  the  market  outcomes  in  one  period  will  affect 
dramatically the competitive situation in upcoming periods. Therefore, we can say 
that competition between systems or networks is inherently dynamic. 
According  to  Katz  and  Shapiro  (1994),  another  main  feature  of  network 
competition is the coordination problem. It is clear that consumers face a problem 
of coordination: When two competing goods affected by network economies are 
first introduced in the market, consumers would like to find a way to coordinate in 
choosing one of the two, as choosing different ones would result in inefficiencies. 
Firms also face a similar coordination problem. When developing new software, 
for example, a software creator would like the new application to be compatible 
with  the  main  operating  system  platforms.  Interestingly,  given  that  consumers benefit from a network being as large as possible, these markets often end up being 
dominated by one of firms initially present in the market. In other words, systems 
or network markets often tip towards one of the firms’ goods. These are the so-
called “tipping equilibria”, as labelled by Mahlueg and Schwarz (2006). If tipping 
occurs,  the  losing  system  will  be  progressively  adopted  by  fewer  and  fewer 
consumers until effectively disappearing from the marketplace (Farrell and Saloner, 
1986 and Katz and Shapiro, 1992) 
Firms will try to use some strategies to make the market tip in their favour. For 
example, firms can opt to set heavily discounted prices in the early life of a good. 
This will secure a large number of costumers in those initial stages, which will 
consequently  increase  the  probability  of  new  consumers  buying  that  good  or 
system in latter stages of the life of the good. The existence of a good in the market 
place that is perceived by firms to be superior to other goods could lead to the same 
result.  Therefore,  in  those  early  stages,  firms  will  frequently  use  aggressive 
advertising campaigns to promote the image of their goods. 
Another  key  issue  which  requires  our  attention  is  the  interoperability  or 
compatibility properties of the system. Often computer users need to interact with 
others using a different system. It is therefore crucial from the point of view of 
users that a system is able to operate or communicate with another system. This 
property is called “interoperability”. So that two systems are interoperable, they 
must  be  compatible  and  interconnected.  From  now  on,  we  will  use  the  terms 
compatibility, interoperability and interconnectivity interchangeably.  
Katz and Shapiro (1994) cite a number of benefits of compatibility, such as lower 
marginal  costs  due  to  scale  economies,  technological  spillovers  and  learning effects, etc. Further, Matutes and Regibeau (1988) point out that compatibility also 
makes possible for consumers to mix and match components from various systems. 
This,  in  turn,  should  make  competition  between  firms  stronger.  Taking  the 
Microsoft case as an example, if Solaris and Windows were compatible, consumers 
could pick Windows as operating system and Solaris as group server software. If 
they were incompatible, consumers using Windows would almost be bound to use 
Windows group server. In principle, competition should be stronger in the first case 
than  in  the  second.  In  fact,  Katz  and  Shapiro  (1986a)  show  that  compatibility 
relaxes competition earlier in the product life cycle but prevents one firm from 
gaining control of the market and therefore intensifies competition in later stages.
19  
It should be obvious that  compatibility  generates  benefits for  consumers (as it 
makes easier the communication between users of different systems) but it will not 
always be preferred by firms. Sun wanted Solaris to be compatible with Windows, 
as  otherwise  their  market  potentially  would  have  been  dramatically  reduced.  
However, some firms might be interested in deliberately making their product 
incompatible with other products in the market, even if they are complementary 
products,  for  a  number  of  reasons.  In  the  case  of  Microsoft,  by  denying 
compatibility to Solaris, M icrosoft was strengthening the market position of its 
work group server software (as it would be perceived as superior to Sun’s due to its 
perfect interoperability with Windows). Another reason behind the degradation of 
interoperability  could  be  that  Microsoft  perceived  work  group  server  and  their 
operating systems as potential competitors to Windows and wanted to protect itself 
from its threat, as discussed before.  
                                                           
19 This result seems to be in line with Microsoft’s move from favouring interoperability to degrading it. 
We will discuss this change in more detail later. In  the  next  subsection,  we  will  review  some  seminal  contributions  from  the 
economics literature on competition between networks in order to explain in detail 
the incentives of firms to grant or degrade interoperability.  
6.3 Competition between networks: dominance and compatibility 
A seminal paper in the literature on competition between networks is Katz and 
Shapiro  (1985),  who  modelled  a  game  between  oligopolistic  firms  in  a  static 
framework in order to study firms’ incentives to make their goods compatible with 
their  competitors’.  The  authors  highlight  the  importance  of  consumers’ 
expectations: If consumers expect a firm to be dominant, then they will be willing 
to  pay more for its  good, and, as  a consequence, the firm  will in  fact become 
dominant.
20 This means that in equilibrium there could be one  dominant firm or 
many competing firms, depending on the consumers’ expectations.
  21 Regarding 
compatibility, it is shown that firms with good reputations or large networks will 
tend to degrade compatibility. Small firms, in contrast, will tend to be in favour of 
compatibility.  
The limitation of Katz and Shapiro (1985) is the lack of dynamics. As we have 
discussed before, competition between systems often takes place in a multiperiod 
scenario.  Therefore,  it  seems  important  to  consider  the  implications  of  those 
dynamics. 
Farrell and Saloner (1986) consider a game between consumers who take their 
purchasing  decisions  at  different  points  in  time.  Over  time,  new  superior 
                                                           
20 The authors use a refined version of the Nash equilibrium, the “fulfilled expectations equilibrium”, 
which will be the recurrent equilibrium solution used in posterior contributions. This solution implies 
that consumers’ expectations regarding the size of the competing networks are correct in equilibrium. 
21 They also show the existence of multiple equilibria for some sets of expectations. technologies appear. Each consumer decides which network to belong (that is to 
buy the old or the new good or technology) given what the other consumers have 
chosen. The equilibrium outcome depends therefore on the size of the installed 
base  when  a  new  good  or  technology  is  introduced,  the  difference  in  quality 
between the new good and the old one and how quickly the network externalities 
around the new good are realized. Interestingly, one of the main results in the paper 
is that network economies may actually inhibit innovation. This problem is referred 
by the authors as “excess inertia”, a socially excessive reluctance to change to a 
new standard (that is, the new good or technology becoming dominant) even when 
this new standard outperforms the old one (that is, the old good or technology 
being  dominant).  So  that  this  effect  happens,  there  must  be  strong  network 
externalities around the old standard. The authors also show that incumbent firms 
can  use  product  preannouncements  and  predatory  pricing  to  deter  entry.  Both 
strategies would aim at protecting the differential in the sizes of the incumbent’s 
and entrant’s networks, which are the core of the competitive advantage of the 
incumbent. 
Katz  and  Shapiro  (1986b)  show  that  generally  compatibility  tends  to  be  below 
socially optimal level and highlight the importance of technology sponsorship in 
determining  which  firm  will  become  dominant  (and  therefore,  which  good  or 
technology will become prevalent).  A firm is said to “sponsor” a technology if it 
uses an aggressive pricing strategy in the early stages of the product life and recoup 
its investment in later stages when being already dominant. Naturally, this can only 
happen if the firm is the sole owner of the right to it in the production of a good 
(for  example,  through  a  patent).  In  the  absence  of  sponsors,  the  firm  which  is 
dominant today will have an advantage due to the installed base and the derived network effects. If two technologies are sponsored, the one that will be superior 
tomorrow will have the advantage. It is worth commenting here that if there were 
scale economies, it would be difficult for a new entrant to sponsor the technology 
to the same extent than the incumbent, as its unit production costs would be higher.  
More recently, Crémer et al. (2000) build on and extend the model by Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) to analyze connectivity in the internet. In particular, they study the 
incentives  of  dominant  backbones  to  provide  interoperability  with  “smaller” 
providers.  Their  model  can  also  be  interpreted  more  generally  as  a  model  of 
competition between systems. The authors assume a market for a network good and 
two firms which can endogenously determine the degree of interoperability of their 
products. Unlike Katz and Shapiro (1985), where goods produced by each pair of 
firms  can  only  be  perfectly  compatible  or  totally  incompatible,
22  Crémer et al. 
(2000)  contemplate also intermediate degrees of   interoperability.  The  network 
around each of the two goods  is constituted by the number of users that have 
already bought the good from the company in the past and are therefore users of the 
network around the good produced by the firm. For simplicity, we will refer to the 
firm the larger installed base  as the “incumbent” and the firm with the smaller 
installed base as the “entrant”. In our case, Microsoft would be the incumbent and 
Sun the entrant.  
Apart  from  the  current  users  of  the  network,  there  are  also  a  number  of  new 
costumers who have to choose from which firm to buy. In other words, they choose 
which network they join. Users benefit from network externalities, in the sense that 
their utility is higher the higher the number of consumers in the network. Further, 
                                                           
22 Although Katz and Shapiro (1985) also analyse the case of firms opting to become compatible with 
some other firms but incompatible with others. They refer to this case as “partial compatibility”. this network externality extends on the number of users in the other network if the 
goods are interoperable, corrected by the degree of interoperability between the two 
networks. In other words, if the goods are fully incompatible, consumers would 
only benefit from an increase in the number of consumers using the same network 
than them; if goods were fully interoperable, consumers would benefit as much 
from  an  increase  in  the  number  of  users  in  their  same  network  than  from  an 
increase  in  the  other  network.  If  the  goods  were  only  partially  interoperable, 
consumers would also benefit from the number of users in the other network but 
only to the extent of the degree of interoperability.  
Motta  (2004)  discusses  the  “tipping  equilibria”  in  the  Crémer  et  al.  (2000) 
framework, that is when the market tips in favour of the incumbent or in favour of 
the entrant and find the less compatible the goods are, the more likely the market 
will tip towards the incumbent. Further, if goods are incompatible, tipping towards 
the entrant cannot occur. In other words, if the incumbent denies compatibility, it 
protects  its  market  dominance.  This  can  help  us  explain  the  incentives  that 
Microsoft had to deny compatibility, as by doing so, it protected its competitive 
advantage. The competitive advantage the incumbent has derives from having a 
larger installed base, which will make a new consumer more likely to choose the 
incumbent’s network instead of the new entrant’s network.   
However,  Crémer  et  al.  (2000)  also  show  that  in  some  circumstances,  the 
incumbent might actually prefer full interoperability. This can only happen when 
the installed base is small relative to the number of new consumers. Although full 
interoperability erodes the incumbents’ competitive advantage, it also increases the 
demand of new consumers in the market.  All in all, the incumbent (or the firm with the largest installed base) will choose full 
or zero interoperability while the entrant (or firm with the smallest installed base) 
will  always  prefer  full  interoperability.  More  recently,  Mahlueg  and  Schwartz 
(2006) extended Crémer et al. (2000) model by allowing more than two firms. 
Interestingly, according to their results, reducing interoperability may actually tip 
the market away from the incumbent. When facing multiple competitors, denying 
compatibility  can  (but  does  not  necessarily  need  to)  actually  worsen  the 
competitive position of the incumbent. In fact, this is more likely to happen the 
higher  the  number  of  rivals  for  a  given  size  of  the  installed  base.  Further,  the 
smaller the installed base, the lower the incentives to deny compatibility. Again, as 
in Crémer et al. (2000), the incumbent faces a trade-off between increasing the 
demand and sacrificing its competitive advantage by making its product compatible 
with that of the entrants. 
To  sum  up,  here  we  have  turned  our  attention  to  the  literature  on  competition 
between  networks.  This  literature  is  highly  relevant  for  the  Microsoft  case,  as 
computer  systems  are  subject  to  network  effects.  We  have  seen  that  the 
expectations  of  consumers  regarding  the  future  size  of  networks  are  crucial  in 
explaining which systems become dominant. We have also seen that markets with 
network externalities often tip in favour of one of the firms. Firms will therefore try 
to implement strategies to tip the market in their interest.  
According to the literature, if two competing networks are incompatible, tipping 
towards the smaller network cannot occur. Therefore, a dominant firm would have 
strong incentives to deny compatibility so that to protect its competitive advantage. 
Incompatibility will confer a competitive advantage to the firm with the largest network: If two systems cannot communicate with each other, a typical consumer 
will choose the system with the highest (expected) number of users, other things 
being  equal.  This  could  explain  Microsoft’s  refusal  to  supply  Sun  with  the 
necessary information to make their work group operating system compatible with 
Windows.  In  contrast,  the  firm  with  the  smallest  network  would  prefer  full 
interoperability so that the difference in the size of the networks does not impact 
consumers decisions. 
If the market is still growing, the dominant firm faces a trade-off: By favouring 
interoperability,  it  will  increase  its  demand  but  it  will  erode  its  competitive 
advantage. Interestingly, Microsoft initially chose to disclose the information to 
make work group operating systems compatible with Microsoft. In contrast, at a 
later stage, it chose the opposite strategy. We have seen some reasons which could 
explain  this  change  of  strategy:  Initially,  when  network  computing  was  in  its 
infancy, Microsoft could have chosen to achieve high degrees of interoperability to 
drive  up  its  own  demand.  At  that  time,  the  market  was  still  growing  and  the  
potential size of the market was still very large relative to the current number of 
users.  When the market was mature and its own network was already large relative 
to the number of new consumers, it chose to deny compatibility presumably to 
protect its competitive advantage.  
7.  Interoperability, innovation and welfare 
In  the  previous  section  we  have  analyse  the  motivations  behind  Microsoft’s 
strategy. Here we discuss the implications of interoperability on innovation and 
welfare. Before starting this discussion, it is important to note that innovation rates 
and market power are not necessarily negatively related: Although it is true that competition  can  stimulate  innovation,  it  is  also  true  that  firms  will  not  have 
incentives  to  conduct  R&D  unless  they  can  appropriate  the  returns  of  their 
investments.  Therefore,  it  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  that  in  some  instances 
excessive enforcement of competition law may damage the incentives to invest in 
R&D (Gilbert, 2007).  
As  mentioned  in  the  introduction,  the  EC  showed  concerns  about  Microsoft’s 
general  business  model,  which  was  thought  to  deter  innovation  and  reduce 
consumer choice.  However, it is far from clear that forcing interoperability (as the 
remedy  imposed)  necessary  benefits  investment  in  innovation.  On  one  hand, 
forcing Microsoft to disclose the necessary information so that the other software 
companies can make their products compatible with Microsoft’s should result in 
cost savings for those firms. Furthermore, interoperability should increase the sales 
of Microsoft’s competitors, as now their products are more valuable to consumers 
(due to the network economies described earlier). The increase in sales should in 
turn increase the incentives to innovate of Microsoft competitors (Kuhn and Van 
Reenen, 2008).
23  However, in order to assess the effects of the remedy on the 
industry incentives to innovate, it is not enough to consider Microsoft competitors’ 
in isolation; the impact on Microsoft is also relevant, especially when Microsoft is 
such a large firm relative to the other firms in the market.  
The impact of the remedy on Microsoft’s incentives to innovate is far less clear. On 
one hand, if the measure would lead to a decrease in Microsoft’s market share, 
naturally Microsoft’s investment on innovation would decrease. However, one may 
also expect Microsoft to invest more intensively in innovation in order to protect its 
                                                           
23 Typically, the R&D costs do not depend on the number of units of output actually produced. 
Therefore, the higher the quantity of output, the lower the R&D cost per unit of output and therefore the 
higher the profitability of the investment on R&D. position from the new competitors rather than relying on foreclosing strategies such 
as tying or denying compatibility.  
Interestingly,  some  analysts  believe  that  Microsoft  has  never  been  particularly 
innovative  and  that  its  core  products  are  essentially  copies  of  already  existing 
products.  In  fact,  it  seems  that  relevant  people  in  the  industry  believe  that 
innovation would be enhanced if Microsoft’s monopoly position was removed. 
24 A 
word of caution is needed here, as the industry association has an obvious interest 
in this matter. 
The results in the economics literature with regard to the  welfare implications of 
incompatibility in Schumpeterian markets are quite ambiguous. In particular, it has 
been shown that if a monopoly supplier of an essential system component ( in the 
Microsoft  case,  Windows  operating  system)  is  prevented  from   restricting 
interoperability, the market for the complementary  market can tip in favour of a 
less efficient firm (Gilbert and Riordan, 2007). If that happened, welfare could be 
harmed by forcing interoperability.  
There are some reasons to believe that, in computer markets, the best solution from 
the social point of v iew would be to have open interfaces with hardware and 
software applications protected by Intellectual Property Rights (patents etc.): If the 
interfaces were open, the prices for the different elements of the system would be  
determined by the extent of those rights rather than by the market power derived 
from the network effects around the platform (Scotchm er, 2004). From the policy 
point of view,  unless there is a violation of the competition law, in which case 
                                                           
24 As Ed Black, president of the Computer & Communications Industry Association (CCIA). Said 
“We're convinced that innovation will be greatly enhanced and improved if Microsoft's heavy hand of 
monopoly is removed from the industry" . See “Has Microsoft stifled innovation?” in BBC News, 
available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/781765.stm. authorities may choose to force firms to disclose the interfaces, as in the Microsoft 
case,  it is  typically  difficult to  find tools  to make the interfaces  open. Reverse 
engineering could be one of those tools but might not work if the technologies are 
very complex (Samuelson and Scotchmer, 2002).  
8.  Summary and final remarks 
In this paper, we have discussed the main economic aspects of the Microsoft case 
and, in particular, those related to the first of the practices assessed by the European 
Commission, that is, the refusal to supply the necessary information to make the 
competitors’ work  group server systems  interoperable with  Windows  Operating 
System.  We  have  highlighted  that  network  economies  and  complementarities 
between the different elements integrating computer systems are at core issues in 
the  case.  We  have  paid  particular  attention  to  the  rationale  behind  Microsoft’s 
strategies according to the economics literature.  
According to traditional theories, a (quasi-) monopolist such as Microsoft would 
not have any incentives to monopolise a complementary market, as it could extract 
the monopolist rents in complementary market (the work group server operating 
system market) by raising the price of the monopoly good (Windows operating 
system). In order for the argument to be correct, a firm must hold an uncontested 
life-long monopoly position. However, Microsoft showed concerns about the birth 
of a new computer model based on server, which some competitors were pushing at 
the time, which could pose a threat on Windows. 
We  have  argued  that  the  case  can  be  viewed  as  a  game  between  systems  or 
platforms  with  network  externalities:  The  Microsoft  platform  (centred  on  the 
Windows  operating  system)  and  the  platform  (or  platforms)  based  on  servers. Microsoft could have chosen to protect itself from the threat of other platforms by 
degrading the compatibility of Windows operating system with work group server 
operating. The literature on network economics has shown that those markets with 
network  externalities  often  tip  in  favour  of  one  of  the  firms.  According  to  the 
literature, if two competing systems are incompatible, tipping towards the one with 
a smaller network cannot occur. Therefore, a dominant firm, such as Microsoft, 
would have strong incentives to deny compatibility so that to protect its market 
position.  
We have also discussed Microsoft’s change of strategy regarding interoperability. 
The  economics  literature  has  shown  that  when  a  market  is  developing,  the 
incumbent firm may choose to achieve high degrees of interoperability to drive up 
its own demand  (as its  installed base is small relative to the market potential). 
When the market is already mature and the firms’ network already large relative to 
the number of new consumers, the incumbent firm would have incentives to protect 
its competitive advantage by degrading interoperability. This seems to fit well with 
Microsoft’s change of strategy. 
All  in  all,  we  have  found  support  in  the  economics  literature  to  the  European 
Commission’s argument that Microsoft had incentives to leverage its market power 
onto  the work group server systems.  Does  this  mean that taking action against 
Microsoft was justified? The advocates of the Schumpeterian paradigm would say 
it was not. In dynamic markets with network effects, any sort of intervention would 
be at best wasteful and at worst distorting. 
Interestingly, the European Commission seemed to acknowledge that the computer 
markets are Schumpeterian. At least the decision on the case seems to indicate that, as the Commission explicitly states that software markets are subject to “shifts in 
paradigm” (see recital 770 in the EC Decision). However, the Commission did not 
take the Schumpeter argument as far as saying that intervention would be worthless 
or would lead to inefficiencies. In fact, the European Commission was concerned 
about the fact that Microsoft was systematically eliminating potential competitors. 
The  Commission  believed  that  Microsoft  was  actually  hampering  dynamic 
competition by abusing its dominant position in the PC operating systems market. 
The refusal to supply the necessary information to  reach compatibility between 
work group server operating systems and Windows would be just another example 
of this general business model.   
Furthermore, although the Commission seemed to recognise the threat of the new 
“server centred” model to the Windows dominance, it considered the market for PC 
operating  systems  and  the  market  for  work  group  server  operating  systems  as 
separate markets. One may wonder whether a wider definition of market could or 
should have been used, given this potential shift in paradigm. If so, perhaps the 
outcome of the case would have been more in the line with Microsoft’s interest.  
There are other issues regarding the antitrust process in dynamic industries that I 
believe should be mentioned here. On one hand, the antitrust process can take too 
long. In highly dynamic industries such as computing, two or three years might be 
an eternity. In the Microsoft case, the process spanned much longer than that. In 
fact, Microsoft only announced it would disclose interoperability information in 
2008, four years after the initial decision was published and ten years after Sun 
filed its complaint. New technologies might “die” in that time interval if they are 
not given a fair chance in the market. Further, the computer industry is highly globalised while antitrust laws or their 
enforcement are not. It would be more efficient and appropriate to assess cases in 
highly  globalised  industries  with  major  international  players  on  the  basis  of 
international antitrust standards and in international courts.  
Finally, in highly dynamic industries, it is very difficult to evaluate the welfare 
effects  of firms’  actions.  In  a static setting, prices  convey  a lot of information 
regarding  welfare.  Besides,  competition  law  practitioners  have  at  their  disposal 
some econometric tools, such as the antitrust logit model, which can be used to 
estimate the impact of firms’ actions in a number of situations. However, a welfare 
analysis  in  a  dynamic  setting  is  typically  very  complicated  and  can  lead  to 
ambiguous  results,  as  it  implies  to  make  a  judgement  on  dynamic  efficiency, 
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